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86 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE RF.VIEW 
A CONTEMPORARY POLITICAi, DILEMMA: THE IMPACT OF 
INTM.LIGl•\NCE OPERATIONS ON FOREIGN POLICY 
by 
Lieutenant Commander James T. Westwood, U.S. Navy 
Intelligence operations fall into three 
broad categories: ( 1) those by which 
1 'raw" data are collected, processed into 
"finished" information1 and dissemi­
nated; (2) those conducted to counter• 
intelligence operations, of whatever 
kind, of rivals; and (3) those intelligence 
operations undertaken to influence the 
course of events 1 sometimes called 
clandestine or covert operations. AH 
three kinds of intelligence operations 
will have an impact on foreign policy. 
This impact will vary in both scope and 
degree1 because it is policy which gives 
rise to intelligence operations. 
In the a ffairs of politically organized 
mankind, there is a ladder of actions 
which commences with variegated, 
often amorphous qualities that have 
come to be called national interests. In 
turn, the element of policy gives a 
certain form and direction to national 
interests, and from policy comes a 
scheme or plan of action which is 
strategy. Strategy, in its turn, is imple­
mented by one or more tactics. Thus, 
intelligence operations are really tactics. 
There is little or nothing in this view 
that is mysterious and even less j if 
anything, that is unreasonable. Where 
there is no policy, there hardly will be 
any strategy-•0r tactics. Where policy is 
large and encompassing, it must natu­
rally be expected that intelligence 
operations will occur, That these opera• 
tions exist and flo urish will not be a 
secret. Indeed, it will be a matter of the 
widest public awareness. Only certain 
sources, certain d etailed methods, and 
the degrees of relative success, it is to be 
hoped-and expected-will be secret. 
Wiiliam E. Colby, the former 
Director of Central Intelligence, has said 
that intelligence will not work if ex• 
posed. He is quite correct. Exposures 
and exposes which reveal sources, 
methods, and degrees of accomplish· 
ment are fundamentally damaging in the 
long term and are critically detrimental 
to states' interests and policies. That is 
why such acts are forbidden by and 
severely punishable under law, One 
marvels at any group or individual who 
seriously supposes that a state and its 
leadership will forego an opportunity to 





hesitate to defend those 
interests and policies. P.fter all, men 
organize collectively for protection 
against common enemies and for the 
promotion of a concept of their welfare 1 
i.e., the furtherance of their interests, In
so doing they elaborate policies to
promote their interests. Intelligence
operations of all types are essential and 
integt·al to this process, and lt is nothing
short of amazing that governments,
their critics, and their populations at 
large regularly lose sight of th ese funda­
mental conditions and prnmises, To
argue that intelligence operations can be
abrogated or suspended is tantamount
to expecting that men, organized for
political and social purposes have no 
interests. Intelligence operations are as 
old as organized man and as new as the 
most current demands made on them. 
Though sometimes seemingly ind•· 
pendent, they fall closely in line with 
the patterns of behavior and the values
of peoples and their governments.
The contemporary confusion that 1
Westwood: Set & Drift: A Contemporary Political Dilemma: The Impact of Inte
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1977
2
Naval War College Review, Vol. 30 [1977], No. 2, Art. 9
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol30/iss2/9
3
Westwood: Set & Drift: A Contemporary Political Dilemma: The Impact of Inte
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1977
4
Naval War College Review, Vol. 30 [1977], No. 2, Art. 9
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol30/iss2/9
5
Westwood: Set & Drift: A Contemporary Political Dilemma: The Impact of Inte
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1977
6
Naval War College Review, Vol. 30 [1977], No. 2, Art. 9
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol30/iss2/9
7
Westwood: Set & Drift: A Contemporary Political Dilemma: The Impact of Inte
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1977
